








The emerging Lutheran Reformation adopted the view that all doctrine should be based on 
the canonical books of Holy Scripture. In addition, Luther considered that all believers should 
be able to read the Bible in their own language. Luther’s translation of the German Bible 
provided a model that was followed through Europe. Luther is critical of medieval allegorical 
interpretations of biblical texts and recommends literal understanding. He nevertheless also 
provides expositions that employ allegory and typology. Luther’s relationship to the later 
emergence of the historical critical reading of the Bible is complex. Reformation writers do 
not have the kind of historical awareness that the first biblical scholars of the Enlightenment 
possess. Luther and his followers were, however, influenced by the Humanist movement in 
several ways; the Humanist call ad fontes, to the original sources, was often invoked in the 
European Reformations.1  
     In addition to the literalist and Humanist reading of the Bible, Martin Luther’s approach 
contains a strong first-person emphasis on the subjective involvement of the believer. The 
biblical word is meant for me personally and should be applied to my own life. German 
scholars have often labeled this feature as Luther’s existential understanding of the Bible, a 
method that connects him with later evangelical revivals as well as with the Enlightenment 
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understanding of individuality. Some scholars have seen here an affinity between Luther and 
Kierkegaard or Luther and twentieth century existential philosophy.2  
    Historically, however, the personal application of the word is nothing new in Christianity 
or Western thinking in general. If we look at the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, 
Luther’s contemporary, we can see that the personal application and appropriation of biblical 
truths in essential for Catholic spirituality as well. Historians of philosophy have paid 
attention to the Hellenistic idea of philosophy as a way of life, that is, not only theoretical 
endeavor but also a practical technique of developing the personal self. Already ancient 
philosophers, like Cicero, outline the so-called oikeiosis or commendation, the view regarding 
how the primary attachment of a person to her own body and soul develops. According to 
Cicero, the need for self-preservation and the attachment to one’s own body are the primary 
events from which an individual starts the development of her desires and social needs as 
well as the care for her own body and soul. This tradition is continued and transformed in 
later Christianity.3 
     While paying attention to such traditions is important, Luther’s reading of the Bible is also 
distinctive. To see how it is distinctive, we need to look briefly at his reading of some 
concrete biblical themes. For this exercise I have chosen the well-known controversy 
between Luther and Erasmus on free will. This controversy starts with Erasmus’ De libero 
arbitrio in 1524. In this work Erasmus criticizes Luther’s denial of free will presented in his 
early writings, especially the so-called Assertio of 1521. Erasmus adopts Luther’s view of the 
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Bible as the sole authority in doctrinal matters as the starting-point of his own, more positive, 
view of free will. In the following I will first present Erasmus’ biblical interpretation very 
briefly and then investigate Luther’s reading of the Bible in his response to Erasmus’ De 
servo arbitrio (1525). 
  
II 
Erasmus proceeds carefully in the issue of free will. He considers is aware that old earlier 
Christian authors had written about this issue in various ways.4 Erasmus wants to ascribe 
some power and freedom to the will. He takes distance from Wycliffe’s view of 
predestination, but he is also critical of Pelagius and does not seem to approve of the 
voluntarist view of John Duns Scotus. For Erasmus, while there is some room for free will, 
grace is the most important power of salvation.5 
     The biblical arguments of Erasmus proceed from the insight that moral responsibility 
assumes some freedom of the will. When God left the human being to rely on human 
decision, some merit and some culpability as well as some freedom could be ascribed to this 
decision.6 Erasmus presents a great amount of biblical sentences that speak about moral 
willing in this sense. For instance, Jesus often appeals to the human will in the Gospel of 
Matthew. This gospel also contains different kinds of exhortations and commandments which 
do not make sense if the human being has no power to respond to them.7 In his biblical 
expositions Erasmus appeals to common sense: voluntary actions and exhortations to will 
something simply assume that there is a will that is capable of doing what is required. 
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Biblical sentences that express voluntary behavior need to be understood in this manner, as 
this is the way how such propositions are commonly understood.8 
       Philosophically speaking, Luther’s and Erasmus’ views are, in fact, compatible 
compatibilists. For both, God’s immutable foreknowledge coexists with human 
responsibility. Erasmus wants to affirm the position of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. For 
him, God’s will is immutable but he thinks that the deterministic position, as defended by 
John Wycliffe, is false. Erasmus can affirm divine foreknowledge and immutability while 
pointing out considering that human will has some freedom.9 Luther affirms divine 
foreknowledge and immutability. Unlike Erasmus, he argues that these doctrines imply a 
strongly deterministic view of reality. However, Luther defines necessity as immutability.10 
This is an extremely soft variant of determinism as it basically only holds that everyone who 
keeps the same course in her actions acts by necessity. Moreover, Luther affirms the view 
that humans can act more freely when God’s grace helps them to cooperate with God.11 
Philosophically, these views do not differ much from those of Erasmus.  
     For Luther, however, theological reasoning regarding human freedom is of a certain kind. 
It leaves philosophical rationalism behind and sticks to the word of God as it has been given 
to us. Doctrinal teaching does not proceed from philosophical consistency but it reflects 
biblical correctness. Theologically, Luther teaches that God brings about “life, death, and 
everything in everything” 12 Most of this activity is, however, due to God’s ineffable and 
unrevealed will. We have no access to this ineffable will and thus cannot discuss it at all. As a 
hidden reality, God works in mysterious ways that we cannot and should not consider. In this 
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sense, Luther affirms the old proverbial saying “What is above us, does not concern us.”13 In 
other words, we cannot reach a propositional understanding of divine will by means of 
philosophy. Instead, we need to follow the rule of faith given in Scripture. Common sense 
and common meanings do not help us in search of theological truth. 
     Through giving the biblical word, God limits himself Godself with regard to our 
knowledge. When we hear and read the revealed word of God, it tells us how God works. In 
this manner we have restricted access to God’s will, namely the access given through God’s 
words in Scripture. Luther employs this insight to refute the Erasmian view of freedom as 
moral responsibility. Luther reads the same biblical passages, claiming that commandment 
and exhortation do not entail the power to do what is required. Luther grants that people often 
do what is required by the word of God; however, this doing is in itself prompted by God and 
corresponds to the commandment for that reason. The biblical word does not, therefore, offer 
free spaces for human decision-making. Rather, it reports some instances in which the divine 
will is known and revealed.14  
     Regarding our topic - Luther’s reading of Scripture - this means that the word of God 
illuminates the reality that otherwise remains in darkness. Reason cannot overcome the 
darkness of theological reality. Moreover, Luther regards reason in divine matters as “blind, 
deaf, stupid and godless”.15 Luther grants that God demands impossible things and considers 
people culpable even when they cannot do otherwise. He considers holds that humans 
“should be content with the words of God, simply believing what they say, because the works 
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of God are incomprehensible”.16 There is no rational understanding of these matters but an 
obedience to the text that transforms its readers. 
     While Luther and Erasmus thus probably have a genuine disagreement concerning the 
moral status of biblical commands, they both attempt to present a Humanist reading of the 
text itself, claiming to reach ad fontes. For Erasmus, textual reading means propositional 
understanding in terms of common sense. An interpreter is obedient to the most obvious 
reading of the passage.  For Luther, however, the biblical text is the only light in the 
theological darkness of humankind. This text cannot be read with the help of reason or 
common sense. Such points of comparison are misleading or illusory. They do not give 
access to the unique content of biblical sentences but only to worldly analogies. Moreover, 
the biblical word is the only revealed will of God. Therefore, other points of comparison 
should be judged on the basis of this unique word and not vice versa. The text is a rule of 
faith that cannot take its meaning from other sources. While Erasmus is an optimist who 
believes that common sense can illuminate biblical meanings, Luther remains a critical 
pessimist who relies on the Bible as the rule of faith that is not cannot be captured by human 
reason. 
     The first-person believer’s perspective has a distinctive purpose for Luther in De servo 
arbitrio. Erasmus interprets biblical personal pronouns like “my good works” or “your wages 
in heaven” to mean that the subject contributes to these works or wages, thus proving that 
free will plays some role. For Luther, however, such personal attributions do not imply any 
personal contribution. Instead, they are to be interpreted as instances of attribution. When I 
say, for instance, “my hand” or “my feet”, I do not mean that I have contributed anything to 
the event fact of possessing hand or feet. Similarly, the biblical expression “my works” or 
                                                 




“your wages” do not express any idea of personal contribution but simply attribution or 
appropriation. Theologically, one has not earned one’s wages in heaven, but they are simply a 
gift attributed to oneself.  My good works are not mine in the sense of my being the effective 
agent, but they are mine because the biblical word has attributed and appropriated them to me 
as gift.17  
     When Luther compares the mode of possessing acts and works to the mode of possessing 
one’s own body, he is in many ways following the classical model of oikeiosis, argued by 
Cicero. My first-person personal perspective does not emerge because of my activities, but it 
is due to the observation of the bodily me who is created and preserved by higher powers and 
only received in my introspection. 
     Such first-person reading of biblical texts from the perspective of the believer is both 
clever and clumsy. It is clever because you one can grammatically use the verb “have” and 
possessive pronouns in the sense of attribution, or gift, without claiming any agency or 
contribution of your one’s own. However, it is also clumsy because such reading does not 
represent a common-sense understanding of doing something. When I help the needy, a 
strictly Lutheran view would assume that God helps them, using me as instrument, letting the 
event to become linguistically attributed to the first person, although in reality God alone is at 
work. While this can be maintained as a pious theological statement, it hardly describes our 
everyday usage of possessive pronouns. 
      Later Protestant debates regarding free will struggle with the viability of such first-person 
readings. For Luther, the struggle is not, however, philosophical. It rather concerns the 
reading of the Bible without claiming any propositional understanding in terms of common 
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I will not proceed further into the deep waters of theological free will. I have only used De 
servo arbitrio to highlight Luther’s basic view of the word of God as our only light and the 
rule of faith in theological darkness.  Some prominent Lutheran hermeneutical doctrines are 
corollaries of this basic view. In the opening pages of De servo arbitrio Luther outlines his 
doctrine of claritas scripturae, clarity of Scripture.18 The Bible is externally clear, because it 
reveals the will of God and illuminates everything. Internal clarity can only be achieved 
through the work of the Spirit. In order to read “my works” as personal merit one would need 
an internal clarity of the phrase. External clarity, however, allows us to compare the phrase 
with the overall Pauline language of justification by faith, a view denying the contribution of 
human works. 
    Another prominent Lutheran doctrine concerns the ability of Scripture to interpret itself, 
scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres.19 As the external, revealed word is the only reliable 
source of theological doctrine, it needs to be interpreted with the help that it provides in its 
entirety. Instead of reason, context, or common sense, the interpreter needs to expound 
biblical words with other external, biblical words. This is why readings that go against 
common sense are sometimes preferred. Since Luther thinks that the Pauline message of 
justification by faith, without works of the law, guides the understanding of phrases like “my 
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works”, he prefers the reading according to which the first-person possessive pronoun “my” 
does not signify agency but merely attribution. 
     For a modern theologian, such principles and Luther’s criticism of Erasmian common 
sense are somewhat puzzling. There seems to be an inherent textual or revelatory positivism 
and even legalism involved in Luther’s understanding of the Bible. If everything else is 
darkness, and only the external word shines in this darkness, this word can only be 
approached in an externalist fashion. At the same time, Lutheran reform programs do not 
resemble modern fundamentalism. The importance of Bible translations, for instance, 
assumes that we can understand the biblical message so that it can be translated into another 
language with the help of common sense meanings.  
     The issue is complex, as Bible translations are typically Humanist ventures that proceed 
from an Erasmian view of common sense meanings and the basic idea of translatability 
between different languages. Luther’s revelatory positivism may in some ways resemble 
more the medieval practice of employing the wordings of the Vulgate as the rule of faith to 
preserve correct doctrine. On the other hand, Luther often appeals to common sense and 
ordinary meanings in his programmatic writings about translation.20  
     Luther is neither a fundamentalist nor a typical Humanist. The Lutheran Reformation 
creates an original variant of the Humanist view of textual interpretation. This view does not 
rely on the received views of natural or Aristotelian reason but it aims at finding both the 
content and the method of interpretation from the source text itself. According to this view, 
each text provides its reader with something like a systemic order, an inherent conceptual 
map of the issue at hand. This primary order is simply “given” as it does not have any 
                                                 





grounds in common sense or Aristotelian categories. What I call the systemic order resembles 
the rhetorical concepts and the so-called topoi to an extent, but it is more varied according to 




The roots of Luther’s view are found in the so-called commonplace books. They were 
employed already in the medieval period, but became very fashionable in the first decades of 
book printing.  Commonplaces are the concepts printed in the margins of the textbooks so 
that the reader can visualize and memorize the teachings by means of these head key words. 
As marginal glosses the commonplaces can follow the inner logic of each text, irrespectively 
of logical or rhetorical structures. For this reason, they describe the text somewhat differently 
from Aristotelian categories or scholastic divisions. While the Aristotelian method applies the 
same universal categories to all different texts, the commonplaces catch the flow of each text 
in a distinctive fashion, condensing its narrative in terms of an individualized set of key 
words.21 
     The most influential systematic description of this pedagogical and mnemotechnical 
method is given in Erasmus’ De duplici copia verborum et rerum of 1512. In this work, 
Erasmus introduces and describes the practice which was still in my own student times 
referred to as the “card box method”. The commonplaces should be noted on book margins, 
but also on loose sheets so that each sheet gives the list of all occurrences of one particular 
commonplace in different source texts. When this collection grows, “finally, whenever 
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occasion demands, you will have ready to hand a supply of materials for spoken or written 
composition, because you will have, as it were, a well-organized set of pigeonholes, from 
which to extract what you want.”22 
     This practice is not only pedagogical and mnemotechnical, but it is also in some ways 
methodological. Each text has its own set of commonplaces. They are not merely external to 
the text but represent its inner flow or argumentative order. This methodological side is 
reflected in more detail in Erasmus’ Ratio verae theologiae of 1518. In this work, Erasmus 
advises the reader of biblical books to collate “theological loci in which you place everything 
you read as if in certain little nests”. The reader can further arrange these topics in organic or 
systematic relationships according to their similarities and differences. Through this 
procedure, all significant features of different biblical books can be highlighted in the manner 
they deserve.23  
     In biblical texts, however, it is not enough to attend only to the various commonplaces. 
They are organized according to an underlying holistic principle which Erasmus calls the 
scopus of the entire text. For Erasmus, Jesus Christ is the scopus of biblical theological texts. 
This means the life and acts of Christ rather than any particular doctrine. The doctrines are 
represented through the various loci or commonplaces. Singular biblical passages can be 
subsumed under generic commonplaces, and they all finally serve the overall scopus. Thus 
we have different nests with their small inhabitants, but also the overall ecosystem, the 
scopus that provides the organizing principle of individual nests.  
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     The first commonplace book of the Reformation, Melanchthon’s Loci communes of 1521, 
takes over the method of Erasmus, developing it towards theological epistemology. Also for 
Melanchthon, Christ and his beneficial deeds provide the scopus that sustains the different 
loci so that they together make the doctrina Christi. Melanchthon takes his commonplaces 
mostly from Paul’s Letter to the Romans. For him, they are not very many. Sin, law, grace 
and faith are among the most important commonplaces.24 
    While the methodological procedure of Melanchthon resembles that of Erasmus, one can 
also see differences between them. Like Luther, Melanchthon highlights the first-person 
perspective of the believer and does not consider it to mean any subjective contribution or 
agency of the Christian. Like Luther, Melanchthon considers that only canonical Scripture is 
valid as the ground of theology. Like Luther, Melanchthon does not rely on common sense or 
worldly wisdom but considers points out that theologians must learn everything from the 
Bible. The biblical rule of faith illuminates other matters, but there are no external criteria 
that could be applied to the biblical word.  
      In this manner, Melanchthon’s Loci communes represents the distinctive kind of critical 
and pessimistic Humanism that is typical of early Lutheranism. The modern scholar needs to 
see that this variant is not flatly fundamentalist. It builds on the assumption that the biblical 
text contains different layers so that a functional set of commonplaces and an overall 
systemic order regarding the scopus emerge. While these ideas are shared with by Erasmus, 
Melanchthon emphasizes the evidence-based approach. He gathers the scriptural evidence 
and organizes it into the main commonplaces. This procedure is supposed to take place intra-
biblically, without the aid of philosophy, common sense, or other external criteria. What 
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Through his entire career, Luther lectured on biblical books at the university and preached 
from the pulpit. We have numerous examples of his reading and exposing biblical texts. 
However, Luther did not draft methodological of  or hermeneutical writings similar to those 
of Erasmus and Melanchthon. Modern studies on Luther’s hermeneutics normally focus on 
explaining some leading principles which can often be expressed as well-known slogans.  
     We have already mentioned some of these slogans, namely: (1) sola scriptura: all 
Christian teaching must be learnt from the Bible alone. (2) Claritas scripturae: the Bible is 
clear and can be understood without external aids. (3) Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres: the 
Bible exposes itself, or the Bible can be understood in terms of its own totality. (4) First-
person The believer’s perspective: we must apply the word of God to ourselves. This slogan 
is also close to the centrality of justification by faith and personal salvation in Luther.  
      Other well-known principles of Luther include the following: (5) was Christum treibet: 
Christ is the center or the scopus of the Bible, and the Bible needs to be interpreted so that it 
focuses on Christ. (6) Law and gospel: the Bible contains twofold material: some of it treats 
commandments of the law, whereas other parts include promises and inform us about the 
grace and the gospel. (7) The spirit and the letter: this Augustinian maxim is often 
understood as the distinction between (8) spoken and written word. This distinction has 
sometimes been interpreted as the difference between the living word of God and the written 




Scripture. In some sense, the spoken word has priority, but the relationship between the two 
is complex. For instance, the doctrine of clarity emphasizes the written, external word.25  
      In this manner, we have a variety of hermeneutical rules applied by Luther in his reading 
of Scripture. The real problem is to construct an overall theory of interpretation with the help 
of all these rules and slogans. While they do not contradict one another, they are often 
fragmentary rules of thumb that need to be expanded towards any systematic theory of 
interpretation. In the following, I will, nevertheless, attempt to outline such a systematic 
theory. While it aims at following Luther’s central tenets, it also adds more systematic 
structure than is available in the historical Luther.  
 
VI 
Historically, Luther’s method of reading Scripture is fairly close to the commonplace method 
of Erasmus and Melanchthon. Like his Humanist colleagues, Luther considers Christ to be 
the scopus of Scripture. Luther does not employ the idea of loci communes consistently, but 
he assumes that there are intermediate cluster concepts between the overall scopus and the 
individual written words, sentences and narratives. For instance, law and gospel can be 
understood as commonplaces; Melanchthon treats them as such. Categories like sin, promise, 
justification, faith and works are likewise typical commonplaces. With the help of such 
cluster concepts, different biblical narratives can be subsumed under the same heading, like 
the different sheets in Erasmus’ card box method. 
     The two cluster concepts of Scripture and the word of God may be revealing in this 
regard, although they still need more study. Scholars typically argue that there is a difference 
between the two clusters, Scripture referring to the written word of the Bible, maybe in 
                                                 




particular the Old Testament, the word of God often referring to the event of preaching the 
gospel that is available especially in the Pauline epistles.26 However, these two cluster 
concepts often overlap in Luther’s writings. In addition, the entire semantic field of doctrina 
in the Reformation is complex. Sometimes doctrina means written doctrine or confession, 
sometimes oral teaching or proclamation. Often it means both in an inseparable unity, within 
which nevertheless some conceptual distinctions can be made.27  
     My own claim is that the relationship between the word of God and Scripture is a 
relationship of emergence and that it resembles the relationship between the commonplaces 
and the text. The word of God emerges from Scripture with a sort of inevitable necessity: a 
sincere reader cannot come to any other conclusion than that this is a book about sin and 
grace, law and gospel. Finally, it is a book about Christ and his work for us. In this manner, 
Scripture is clear and it exposes and explains itself. However, the commonplace doctrines 
need to emerge from the text. Unlike Erasmus, Luther does not rely on common sense and 
rational analogies. Instead, he thinks that the Bible is proactive, giving birth to the correct 
readings by itself. Such self-efficiency of Scripture has sometimes been understood as an 
aspect of self-interpretation.28 
      Self-interpretation and self-efficiency need not be strange or magical hermeneutical 
doctrines. The Humanist view of commonplaces assumes that texts have a natural 
organization and that they imitate nature. Commonplaces extracted from the text are no 
political decisions or deliberate constructions but themes that naturally emerge from the text, 
guiding its interpretation. Good coherent texts are self-interpretative and self-effective in the 
                                                 
26 For these terms, see Christoph Schwöbel, “Bible IV,” in Religion Past and Present 2 (2007), 13-17. 
27 The best new study of this is P. Büttgen et al. (ed.), Vera doctrina: Zur Begriffsgeschichte der Lehre von 
Augustinus bis Descartes (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009). 




sense that you can reach a consensus with regard to which themes capture the flow of the text 
adequately. Biblical texts deviate from the natural course of the world and are thus not open 
to common sense in the same manner. We may, however, think with Luther that their 
inherent systemic order is given by God so that the commonplaces of sin, law and grace as 
well as the Christocentric scopus emerge inevitably from the biblical text. 
      This emergent relationship between doctrinal commonplaces and scriptural text is, I 
think, a basic assumption in some well-known features of Lutheranism. The theory of 
preaching assumes that one hears the word of God from the pulpit. The pastor typically 
organizes the biblical text in terms of commonplaces so that the living word of God interacts 
with the text. The commonplaces are entirely based on the text; at the same time, they are 
emergent concepts which make the text a living word of God. Another typically Lutheran and 
Protestant feature is that the Bible can in some ways replace the magisterium as an instance 
of doctrinal interpretation.29 This bold claim results from the assumed capacity of self-
interpretation and self-efficiency. I am ready to grant that not everything in the magisterium 
or episcopacy can be replaced with this claim. However, one needs to see that the authority of 
the Bible is a practical and operative authority.  
 
VII 
Systematically, we can discuss Luther’s view in terms of a theory of doctrine. This is a 
modern discussion initiated by George Lindbeck and has continued until the present day.30  If 
we ask very generally whether the primary natural vehicle of theological doctrine is personal 
experience, reason or language, Luther’s view most likely would consider language as such a 
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vehicle. The first-person perspective of the believer gives personal experience some role, but 
only in encountering the primary reality of the word. As the linguistic reality of Scripture 
cannot be adequately approached with common sense or Aristotelian reason, Luther’s view is 
to be labeled as a rule theory of doctrine. The language of the Bible gives provides the rules 
of theological doctrine without much regard to logical categories or common sense. 
     What basic rules does the description given above apply? First, it obviously employs a 
language restriction rule. All theological knowledge is based on biblical revelation. This rule 
needs many kinds of differentiations. On the one hand, it says that the biblical way of 
speaking is how true theology is articulated pronounced. On the other hand, there is probably 
room for considering how analogies to other ways of speaking are possible so that, for 
instance, translations can be made and new issues not mentioned in the Bible can be 
encountered in responsible fashion.31 
    The second basic rule can be labeled as a rule of systemic order. This rule says that the 
authoritative text has a certain inherent pattern or order which enables its own coherent 
interpretation. The loci method captures such systemic order, as the text has its own basic 
concepts and an overall scopus which most readers can detect. The concepts or themes 
emerge from the text by their own right, guiding its interpretation. The rule of systemic order 
is in some ways connected with a hermeneutics of trust. It does not consider the text to be 
simply raw material for later constructions but a coherent totality which can guide and 
preserve its own interpretation. The rule is, however, not naive but allows a variety of 
interpretations. We might say, using a non-biblical example, that one can interpret 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet in many different ways, but claiming that there is no love 
story involved would go against the rule of systemic order. 
                                                 




     The rule of systemic order maintains that texts contain clues regarding their own 
interpretation. In practice, this means the availability of scopus and some loci that are given 
by the source text itself rather than any general methodology external to the text. In this 
manner, the rule of systemic order is critical of abstract philosophical and scholastic 
principles. It relies on a Humanist congeniality to the text. Obviously, the issue is complex.  I 
do not maintain that even very coherent texts can entirely control later interpretations. But I 
do claim that the text is not simply a victim of its later users or an empty table to which the 
power-holders can ascribe all kinds of meanings. A coherent text has such systemic order that 
equips it with considerable self-efficaciousness and internal criteria to distinguish between 
adequate and less adequate later readings.32 
      The concept of rule may also be illuminating in this regard. Rules are by their very nature 
proactive as they inform and control the reality. If epistemic pessimism is connected with a 
rule theory of theological sentences, the relative control of reality increases, as everything 
else is assumed to remain in darkness and thus cannot provide competing criteria to the given 
rules.  
     Generally speaking, Luther reads the Bible in terms of a rule theory rather than 
propositional understanding. The debate between Erasmus and Luther offers remarkable 
evidence for this view. Erasmus clearly wants to understand biblical sentences with the help 
of common sense. For Luther, however, propositional understanding is often misleading or 
even a trick of worldly reason. Luther wants to listen to the biblical language as a rule of 
faith, a rule that gives its own interpretation from the totality of the linguistic source. 
Therefore he often abandons common sense readings and claims that God is hidden, or even 
hidden under the opposite. The linguistic expressions of this idea cannot be read as mental 
                                                 




propositions involving a philosophical truth theory, but they are to be understood as 
sentential rules, the peculiar way of speaking in theology. 
      To say that Luther adheres to a rule theory of biblical doctrine does not make the 
Reformer modern in any particular way. The idea of regula fidei is a classical view of 
doctrine, and one can have more or less fideistic variants of this idea. The assumption that the 
rule of faith can express doctrine in terms of commonplaces and overall scopus moderates 
fideism and literalism considerably. Both Erasmus and Luther grant the human mind an 
ability to grasp central teachings of Scripture, although the dynamics of this ability is rule-
based in Luther and common sense-based in Erasmus. 
     Neither can the rule theory be called particularly Protestant. If we look at the Ratio 
studiorum of the Jesuits order from the late 16th century, we may read some advice that is 
very similar to Luther’s views. The biblical scholar is advised “not to use scholastic method 
in questions peculiar to Holy Writ.” “In order to ascertain the genuine sense of Holy Writ, he 
must note the idiomatic expressions and figures of speech peculiar to Scripture. He must 
skillfully compare the passage he is reading not only with that which precedes and follows 
but also with other passages where the same phrase will have sometimes the same, sometimes 
a different meaning.”33 
     Given that this passage from the Ratio studiorum is representative of Catholic biblical 
scholarship, we need not be afraid of Luther’s confessional slogans. In fact, many of these 
slogans belong to the broader Humanist current of early modern Western theology that was 
shared by different churches. They are signposts for reading Scripture in responsible and 
authentic fashion. 
                                                 
33 Ratio studiorum (1599), transl. A. Farrell, (www.bc.edu/sites/libraries/ratio/ratio/1599.pdf), 30-31. 
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